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THE TIPPING POINT – REEVALUATING 
THE ASNEF-EQUIFAX SEPARATION 
OF COMPETITION OF DATA PRIVACY 
LAW IN THE WAKE OF THE 2017 
EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 
Olivia A. Altmayer 
Abstract: Contrary to the Court of Justice for the European Union’s decision in 
the Asnef-Equifax case, in a world of big data, it is inefficient and ineffective to 
treat EU competition law and EU data protection law as entirely separate legal 
considerations. Reevaluating this stance is critical in sectors where customer 
data is highly sensitive, and therefore highly valuable to those who steal it, 
particularly for the financial and healthcare sectors. Looking forward, companies 
that store and use biometric data will have to be similarly scrutinized. 
To correct this problem, the EU has numerous paths it can take: (a) continue as 
is, treating competition and data protection as separate legal considerations, (b) 
enact a new body of regulatory law to specifically deal with data protection and 
competition, or (c) begin using existing competition law, specifically Article 101 
of the TFEU, to address data protection concerns. This paper will argue that to 
best serve the interests of all relevant players – government, businesses, and 
consumers – option (c) is the optimal choice. Additionally, in implementing this 
change, the EU can use the FRAND patent and competition law precedence in 
devising a new data protection and competition framework. 
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Since 2006 when the Court of Justice decided the Asnef-Equifax case1 
for the European Union (EU), the landscape of data security has changed 
drastically. Of the eighteen largest data breaches of all time, only two 
occurred before 2010 and both were tied to the same hacker.2 Of the breaches 
that have occurred since, the 2017 Equifax breach is thought to be the most 
dangerous because the data stolen from an estimated 143 million consumers 
included social security numbers, which are characterized as extremely 
sensitive data.3 Breaches that involve such a vast swath of sensitive consumer 
information pose a real threat to economic security.4 It is clear, then, that 
governments need to take additional steps to combat a heightened threat to 
the security of sensitive information. This is especially true for credit and 
medical information which are of most value to hackers and therefore most 
at risk.5 
One possible approach to increasing the protection on this sensitive data 
is incorporating data protection analysis into competition law review when 
private companies propose or challenge mergers. There is precedent for this 
sort of combined approach regime with patents and competition law in the 
EU. The situation appears ripe for creative solutions when it comes to big 
companies and the protection of consumer data and information. The EU is 
taking steps to drastically increase the strength of its data protection laws, 
with the introduction of General Data Protection Regulation, which took 
effect in May 2018. During the same time frame, the European Commission 
has also increased competition law scrutiny on companies operating in the 
EU. Adding a review of data protection policies and procedures would be a 
good way for the government to mitigate the problem of increased data 
security threats and make the data and information of European consumers 
safer. However, it is much less clear that such a regime would be embraced 
or effective in other jurisdictions, especially the United States. 
                                                          
 1 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, 
SL and Administación del Estado Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc), 
2006 E.C.R I-11125 [hereinafter Asnef-Equifax]. 
 2 Computer hacker Albert Gonzalez was held responsible for both the 2006 TJX 
Companies, Inc. breach and the 2008 Heartland Payment Systems breach. Taylor Armerding, 
The 18 Biggest Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO ONLINE 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-
21st-century.html (last updated Dec. 20, 2018). 
 3 Tara Siegel Bernard, Tiffany Hsu, Nicole Perlroth & Ron Lieber, Equifax Says 
Cyberattack May Have Affected 143 Million in the U.S., N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/business/equifax-cyberattack.html?_r=0. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Credit information is tied to an individual through their social security number or other 
national identification number. Aatif Sulleyman, NHS Cyber Attack: Why Stolen Medical 
Information Is So Much More Valuable Than Financial Data, INDEPENDENT (May 12, 
2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/nhs-cyber-attack-
medical-data-records-stolen-why-so-valuable-to-sell-financial-a7733171.html. 
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This note focuses on an observable intersection of data protection and 
competition law to create a more efficient regulatory environment with the 
goal of offering consumers the best protection for their personal data at the 
least cost for the companies storing and processing that data. Part I will 
review competition law and its recent developments in Europe. Part II will 
focus on data protection law’s development in the EU and the US. Part III 
will analyze the decision made by the Court of Justice for the EU in the 2006 
Asnef-Equifax case. Part IV will propose possible choices for the EU in 
combating the possible failings of the current system. Finally, Part V will 
serve as the conclusion and discuss the optimal strategy going forward for 
the EU in this area of the law. 
II. COMPETITION LAW 
A. History of Competition Law 
In preparing to discuss the intersection of competition law and data 
protection law in the EU at present, it is first important to review the origins 
and purposes of both bodies of law. Competition law is the older of the two 
and can trace its roots back to ancient times. There is evidence that 
competition law dates back to ancient Greece6 and Egypt.7 The modern 
iteration of competition law began in the late 19th century in the United 
States with the passage of the Sherman Act, which focused on preserving the 
competitive market and benefiting consumers through fair prices.8 
The Chicago School approach to competition law has been dominant in 
both the United States and Europe since the 1970s.9 This approach requires 
an assessment of market structure, company behavior, and company 
performance in the market to determine whether a company’s conduct 
violates competition law.10 Additional competition law concerns include 
protecting the free market from “artificial restraints,”11 ensuring the efficient 
allocation of resources, and recognizing barriers to entry for would-be market 
players.12 Horizontal sharing of information is one of the ways that 
companies reduce competition in the market, which was the point of concern 
in the Asnef-Equifax case13 and is a primary component of the credit bureau 
                                                          
 6 THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 5 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 7 Lorenzo F. Pace, EUROPEAN ANTITRUST LAW: PROHIBITIONS, MERGER CONTROL AND 
PROCEDURES 3 (2007). 
 8 Frederic Sautet, The Shaky Foundations of Competition Law, N.Z. L.J. 186, 189-90 
(2007). 
 9 THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION, supra note 6, at 8. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Erich Hoppmann, Workable Competition - The Development of an Idea on the Norm 
for the Policy of Competition, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 61 (1968). 
 12 Pace, supra note 7, at 39. 
 13 Asnef-Equifax, supra note 1, at I-11125. 




B. Competition Policy in the EU 
Competition policy in the European Union began in March of 1957 with 
the Treaty of Rome, in which Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) were some of the first treaty provisions to have a direct 
effect on the EU.15 As of 2007, these provisions are Articles 101 and 10216 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).17 In 1962, 
the European Commission, the EU’s politically independent executive 
body,18 received the direct power to enforce competition law under 
Regulation 17, later superseded by Regulation 1/2003.19 The Commission is 
“responsible for the implementation and orientation of Community 
competition policy.”20 The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the highest court 
in the European Union, ensures that the interpretation and application of EU 
law is consistent across member states.21 In the competition law arena, the 
ECJ ensures stability of the law and maintains preeminence over national 
laws. The ECJ has also interpreted Articles 85 and 86 to be real applicable 
law and not merely policy guidelines.22 The ECJ is further responsible for 
protecting the rights of private individuals under antitrust law.23 Together, 
the European Commission and the ECJ give teeth to the European Union’s 
competition policy. 
The European Commission and the ECJ have two avenues to enforce 
competition law in the EU. The first is enforcement through merger control, 
and the second is legal action for violation of Article 101 or 102. The 
European Commission is tasked with assessing the effects of a merger on the 
market and has the sole power to make decisions regarding whether a 
proposed merger is in compliance with Regulation 139/04.24 The two phases 
of merger review are: (i) assessment of whether the market concentration 
may create a threat to competition; and if a threat is present (ii) a more 
                                                          
 14 Marc Rothemund & Maria Gerhardt, The European Credit Information Landscape: An 
analysis of a survey of credit bureaus in Europe, ECRI INDUSTRY SURVEY 2 (Jan. 2011). 
 15 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW 1 (Kiran Klaus Patel & Heike 
Schweitzer eds., 2013). 
 16 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 17 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 1. 
 18 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-
bodies/european-commission_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 19 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 1. 
 20 PACE, supra note 7, at 199. 
 21 COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (CJEU), https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
 22 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 10. 
 23 PACE, supra note 7, at 206. 
 24 Id. at 357. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:37 (2018) 
42 
thorough assessment of the threats to competition which may culminate in a 
decision to block the merger.25 Article 21(2) of Regulation 139/0426 serves 
as a check on this review power, saying that the Commission’s exclusive 
power is subject to review by the Court of Justice.27 Regulation 1/200328 
specifically grants jurisdiction to national courts to hear antitrust cases.29 
Finally, if the European Commission finds that there has been an antitrust 
infringement, then the Commission should propose measures to end the 
infringement.30 If that fails, then the Commission is to record the 
infringement in a reasoned decision.31 Therefore, both the courts and 
Commission can impose penalties for uncured antitrust infringement.32 
Competition law in Europe, “the set of laws which ensure that 
competition in the marketplace is not restricted in a way that is detrimental 
to society,” is distinct from U.S. antitrust law.33 European case law conveys 
a special responsibility on firms holding a dominant market position to make 
sure that their conduct does not distort or lessen competition.34 Governmental 
interventions under competition law are to only occur when “they can be 
shown to maximize welfare overall.”35 Therefore, especially in Europe, one 
can consider competition law as a means to protect social welfare.36 
C. Recent Developments in EU Competition Policy 
The European Commission has been very active recently in bringing 
competition law enforcement actions against tech giants like Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft, and Apple. By doing so, they are walking the fine line 
between addressing concerns of market failures and public policy, risking the 
real possibility of suppressing innovation through excessive intervention.37 
                                                          
 25 Id. 
 26 Council Regulation 139/2004 of Jan. 20, 2004, On the Control of Concentrations 
between Undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 17 [hereinafter Merger 
Regulation]. 
 27 Pace, supra note 7, at 357. 
 28 Council Regulation 1/2003 of Dec. 16, 2002, On the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1. 
 29 Pace, supra note 7, at 310. 
 30 Id. at 209. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 210. 
 33 Massimo Motta, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 30 (2004). 
 34 Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings, COM (2009) 2009/C 45/02 final (Feb. 24, 2009), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN. 
 35 THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW, supra note 15, at 2. 
 36 See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987). 
 37 Peter Alexiadis, Forging a European Competition Policy Response to Online 
Platforms, 18 BUS. L. INT’L (IBA) 91, 93-94 (May 2017). 
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The underlying principle for this increased scrutiny goes back to the 
European idea that when a firm is dominant in a market, it faces a heightened 
responsibility for ensuring that its actions do not lessen competition.38 
Increasingly, the European Commission has been looking for anti-
competitive conduct related to the treatment of data by these technology 
companies, in part because of a drastic increase in the data volume processed 
and held and a substantial increase in electronic communication.39 
The first big case was the review of the Google and DoubleClick 
merger, which the European Commission cleared after going through the 
merger review process in 2007.40 At this point in time Google was the most 
popular internet search engine and was offered to users for free, and 
DoubleClick was a U.S. entity that sold “ad serving, management and 
reporting technology worldwide to website publishers, advertisers and 
advertising agencies.”41 What concerned the European Commission was the 
potential foreclosure effect on the online advertising market.42 However, the 
transaction ended up being approved because the Commission found that the 
switching costs were not cost-prohibitive for publishers and customers to 
switch between providers within the online advertisement market.43 The U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) similarly cleared the transaction.44 One 
FTC Commissioner, Pamela Jones Harbour, dissented to the majority 
decision because she felt that the decision did not adequately address the 
competition concerns and the privacy interests of consumers, but in this 
viewpoint she stood alone.45 
The European Commission also reviewed Microsoft’s acquisitions of 
Skype and LinkedIn. In 2011, the European Commission received notice that 
Microsoft was planning to acquire Skype.46 The European Commission 
cleared this transaction because it decided that the common market would 
                                                          
 38 Commission Communication, supra note 34. 
 39 Monika Kuschewsky & Damien Geradin, Data Protection in the Context of 
Competition Law Investigations: An Overview of the Challenges, 37 WORLD COMPETITION L. 
& ECON. REV. 69 (2014). 
 40 Summary of Commission Decision in Case COMP/M.4731 of 11 Mar. 2008, 2008 O.J. 
(C 184) 10. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 11-12. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Federal Trade Commission, Statement Concerning Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 
071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/418081/071220googledc-
commstmt.pdf. 
 45 Pamela Jones Harbour, Dissenting Statement in the Matter of Google/DoubleClick, 
FTC File No. 071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-matter-
google/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.pdf. 
 46 Prior Notification of a Concentration in Case COMP/M.6281 of 10 Sept. 2011, 2011 
O.J. (C 268) 12. 
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not be significantly impacted as a result of the merger.47 With Microsoft’s 
2016 acquisition of LinkedIn, the Commission was stricter. They only 
approved the deal subject to certain conditions.48 First, LinkedIn software 
would have to be removable from Microsoft products.49 Second, other 
professional social network services would have to still be operational on 
Microsoft products.50 Finally, LinkedIn competitors would still have to be 
able to access the “Microsoft Graph” to help drive new subscribers to their 
own competing social networks.51 Despite agreeing to allow this merger, 
conditional on the parties meeting the designated conditions, the European 
Commission acknowledged having a concern over the privacy effects of 
market concentration.52 The worry, brought up at the very end of their 
decision, is that the privacy policies of the newly consolidated entity would 
become more relaxed as a result of decreased market competition.53 
The European Commission also reviewed Facebook’s proposed 
acquisition of WhatsApp in 2014.54 At the time, the Commission cleared the 
transaction because the concentration of user data after the consolidation was 
thought to be a data protection issue, not a competition law issue, with the 
Commission specially writing that “any privacy-related concerns flowing 
from the increased concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a 
result of the transaction do not fall within the scope of EU competition law 
rules but within the scope of EU data protection rules.”55 The Commission’s 
investigation also revealed that consumers were increasingly concerned with 
the privacy and security of their personal information.56 
The merger approval in 2014 did not actually end up closing the case 
for Facebook. In December 2016, the European Commission decided to 
review the decision and sent a Statement of Objections to Facebook, a formal 
step in an investigation by which the Commission alerts the company of the 
objections it is facing.57 The specific claim was that during the 2014 merger 
                                                          
 47 Non-opposition to a Notified Concentration in Case COMP/M.6281 of 22 Nov. 2011, 
2011 O.J. (C 341) 2. 
 48 European Commission Press Release IP/16/4284, Mergers: Commission Approves 
Acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, Subject to Condition (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4284_en.htm. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Commission Decision in Case M.8124, ¶ 350 (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Commission Decision in Case COMP/M.7217 (Oct. 3, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132
_EN.pdf. 
 55 Id. at ¶ 164. 
 56 Id. at ¶ 87. 
 57 European Commission Press Release IP/16/4473, Mergers: Commission Alleges 
Facebook Provided Misleading Information about WhatsApp Takeover (Dec. 20, 2016), 
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review, Facebook provided misleading information about whether user 
accounts of both companies could be matched. In 2014, Facebook said it 
would not be able to do so, information which the Commission took into 
account when deciding to clear the transaction.58 However, in August 2016, 
WhatsApp announced changes to its terms of service and privacy policy 
which allowed for the possibility of linking WhatsApp phone numbers with 
Facebook user identities, a direct contradiction to the 2014 claims of 
Facebook.59 Because Facebook failed to provide correct information in 2014, 
the Commission imposed a €110 million fine60 on the company in May 
2017.61 This was the first fine of its kind following the adoption of the 2004 
Merger Regulation.62 
Facebook is also facing a similar complaint in Germany. The Federation 
of German Consumer Organizations (VZBV), a German consumer agency, 
is investigating whether Facebook abused its dominant market position and 
breached German data protection rules through unlawful data sharing.63 If 
German authorities find a violation of competition law through a non-market 
matter (data protection), that decision could pave the way for the EU to 
follow suit.64 Competition Commissioner Margarethe Vestager has 
acknowledged as much, saying “it shouldn’t only be the Commission doing 
things that are new in terms of developing competition law.”65 
Finally, there is precedent in the EU for using competition law to 
strengthen regulation for another body of law; specifically, competition law 
and patent law. In 2014 there were two cases, Motorola v. Apple66 and 
Samsung v. Apple67, which centered on something called “standards” which 
“ensure compatibility and interoperability of telecom networks and mobile 
                                                          
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4473_en.htm. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 See Merger Regulation, supra note 26, at 15. The Merger Regulation allows for the 
imposition of a fine up to 1% of the aggregated turnover of a company that intentionally or 
negligently provides incorrect or misleading information to the Commission. 
 61 European Commission Press Release IP/17/1369, Mergers: Commission Fines 
Facebook €110 Million for Providing Misleading Information about WhatsApp Takeover 
(May 28, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Press Release, VZBV, VZBV Verklagt WhatsApp: Verbraucher Mussen Hoheit Über 
Daten Behalten (Jan. 30, 2017), www.vzbv.de/pressemitteilung/vzbv-verklagt-whatsapp-
verbraucher-muessen-hoheit-ueber-daten-behalten. 
 64 Nuria Boot & Georgios Petropoulos, German Facebook Probe Links Data Protection 
and Competition Policy, BRUEGEL BLOG (Mar. 14, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/03/german-
facebook-probe-links-data-protection-and-competition-policy/. 
 65 Foo Yun Chee, German Regulator Wee Suited to Investigate Facebook: EU’s Vestager, 
REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-facebook-antitrust/german-
regulator-well-suited-to-investigate-facebook-eus-vestager-idUSKCN0W91OB. 
 66 Commission Decision No. AT.39985, 2014 O.J. (C 344/06). 
 67 Commission Decision No. AT.39939, 2014 O.J. (C 350/08). 
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devices.”68 Standards are composed of “standard-essential patents,” which 
are distinct from ordinary patents because they are necessary for standards 
and implemented in nearly all of telecommunication devices.69 
In Motorola v. Apple, Apple wanted to enter the mobile phone market 
and sought to license certain standard-essential patents from Motorola, which 
Motorola refused and for which it sought court ordered injunctions.70 Apple 
defended itself saying that through its conduct, Motorola was violating 
competition law, specifically Article 102 of the TFEU.71 This argument was 
successful. The EU Commission held that an injunction was unnecessary and 
no fines were ordered for Motorola’s competition violation because of a lack 
of case-law precedent.72 
In Samsung v. Apple, Samsung sought preliminary and permanent 
injunctions against Apple on the basis of some of its standard-essential 
patents.73 The Commission viewed the conduct of Samsung between April 
2011, when they initially sought the injunctions, and December 2012, when 
they withdrew the injunction actions, as possibly violating competition law 
under Article 102 of the TFEU.74 In hearing these concerns from the 
Commission, Samsung made certain commitments so that no competition 
violation proceedings would continue.75 Both cases represent competition 
law reaching out to impose limitations or requirements in another body of 
law, laying the groundwork for a similar interchange between competition 
law and data protection law. 
III. DATA PROTECTION LAW 
A. History of Data Protection Law 
Data protection law, what it is and how it works, is equally important to 
understanding the proposal of this paper. Compared to competition law, data 
protection law is a much more recent development, and centers largely on the 
concept of privacy. In Europe, privacy is a fundamental right, similar to the 
right of “freedom of speech” in the United States.76 It is important to note 
that there is no fundamental right of privacy in the United States.77 Thus, EU 
                                                          
 68 Commission Decision No. AT.39985 at ¶ 5. 
 69 Id. at ¶ 6. 
 70 Id. at ¶ 11-12. 
 71 See id. at ¶ 20. 
 72 Id. at ¶ 24-25. 
 73 Commission Decision No. AT.39939 at ¶ 12. 
 74 Id. at ¶ 13. 
 75 Id. at ¶ 14-20. 
 76 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1170 
(2000). 
 77 McKay Cunningham, Complying with International Data Protection Law, 84 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 421, 422 (2016). 
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data protection law derives from Europeans’ fundamental right of privacy.78 
Scholars made comparisons between intellectual property and personal 
information and data, and suggested that a property right should be granted 
to individuals by law much like intellectual property rights.79 If personal 
information carried a property right, companies seeking to use that 
information could license it, but would also leave the individual the choice 
of whether to license.80 No such property right exists in the U.S., but Europe 
took a rights-based approach to its data protection regulatory regime.81 With 
society’s increased reliance on technology, data protection concerns have 
come to the forefront as have questions about the best way to protect personal 
information. 
The purpose of data protection law is to regulate and offer governmental 
protection to the increasing amount of digital data that moves between 
individuals, between organizations, or from an individual to an organization 
or vice versa.82 Mechanisms invoked by this body of law to achieve its goals 
are minimum standards for organizational privacy policies and specific 
procedures for when a breach occurs. One complication that has continued 
to come up is data that flows between countries with different data protection 
laws, a function of the global interconnectivity provided by the internet.83 
Ensuring compliance with all data protection laws can be difficult, and most 
companies with international operations must comply with the strictest set of 
rules. Contradictions between such laws, especially between the lax and 
sometimes disjointed approach of the U.S. and the strict approach of the EU, 
make for a difficult and costly regulatory environment for international 
companies to navigate.84 
B. Data Protection Policy in the EU 
In the EU, data protection law has developed much more uniformly than 
it has in the United States.85 This is partly a reaction toward Nazism and is 
also due to Europe’s treatment of privacy as a fundamental right since the 
end of World War II.86 Europeans experienced the havoc the Nazis and other 
fascists were able to wreak using census records, classified files – private and 
personal information – and understood the need for ensuring that such 
                                                          
 78 Tracie B. Loring, Comment, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection 
Afforded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 422 (2002). 
 79 Samuelson, supra note 76, at 1126-27. 
 80 Id. at 1129. 
 81 See McKay Cunningham, Privacy in the Age of the Hacker: Balancing Global Privacy 
and Data Security Law, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 643, 668 (2012); Samuelson, supra note 
76, at 1128. 
 82 Cunningham, supra note 77, at 422. 
 83 Id. at 434-35. 
 84 Id. at 421. 
 85 Loring, supra note 78. 
 86 Samuelson, supra note 76, at 1170-71. 
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information is as well protected as possible.87 
The German state of Hesse enacted the first comprehensive data 
protection law in 1970.88 Afterwards, six unifying principles formed the 
foundation of further European data protection legislation.89 These principles 
are openness, individual access and correction, collection limitation, use 
limitation, disclosure limitation, and security.90 An example of the national 
legislation adopted during this time was the German 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz of 1990, a federal data protection act that came out 
of a German Constitutional Court decision.91 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
laid the foundation for the first broad reaching legal framework concerning 
data privacy.92 In 1981 the Council of Europe held a convention for the 
protection of individuals specifically discussing automatic processing of 
personal data.93 Both the Council of Europe and the OECD recognized a need 
for developing a framework that unified privacy and data principles.94 The 
drafting and enacting of EU Council Directive 95/46/EC on October 24, 1995 
saw their vision of a uniform data protection and privacy framework 
realized.95 
The 1995 Directive’s objective was to “protect the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with 
respect to the processing of personal data.”96 It defines personal data as 
information relating to an “identified or identifiable” person (the “data 
subject”), who is anyone who can be identified by reference to “an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to . . . physical, 
physiological, mental, economic or social identity.”97 Also important for the 
regulation is the “controller” of personal data which can be a natural person, 
public authority, agency or other entity that “determines the purposes and 
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means of the processing of personal data.”98 The Directive authorizes 
personal data processing only if certain conditions occur. There are 
heightened protections afforded to special categories of personal information 
including, “race or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, trade-union membership, and data concerning health or sex life.”99 A 
judicial remedy addresses breach of the national provisions adopted pursuant 
to this Directive.100 The adoption of the TFEU in 2012, which states that 
“everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them,” 
reinforced this right.101 
C. Recent Developments in EU Data Protection Policy 
In 2012, the European Commission decided that the Directive was no 
longer current102 and there were gaps in the protection of individuals’ 
personal data because of rapid technological advances that had taken place.103 
The proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),104 which took 
effect in May of 2018, is Europe’s proposal to upgrade the principles of the 
Directive so as to be most effective in the new digital age.105 The stipulated 
goals for the GDPR are: (i) to address the impact of new technologies; (ii) to 
enhance the internal market dimension of data protection; (iii) to address 
globalization and improve international data transfers; (iv) to provide a 
stronger institutional arrangement for the effective enforcement of data 
protection rules; and (v) to improve the coherence of the data protection legal 
framework.106 
The GDPR requires organizations to implement certain technical and 
organizational measures in order to secure data subject’s rights and ensure 
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the proper processing of personal data.107 It also specifically grants 
individuals the right to data portability, which is an additional challenge for 
companies holding and processing personal information.108 Criticisms about 
the GDPR include it being overly complicated, that the language involves 
too much legalese, and that it does not lay out clearly enough the parameters 
and methods for achieving its stated goals.109 
GDPR introduces a penalty system with significant fines, representing 
a significant change for businesses with connections to the EU. Article 83 of 
the GDPR provides for two levels of administrative fines for violations of 
certain provisions of the law including obligations of the data processor and 
controller, certification body, and monitoring body.110 Infringements of any 
of these obligations can lead to administrative fines of up to €10,000,000 or 
2% of a company’s total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.111 
More serious infractions under the law, including violation of a subject’s data 
rights, violation of basic principles for processing such as conditions for 
consent, or unlawful transfers of personal data to third parties or international 
organizations, carry even heavier fines – up to €20,000,000 or 4% of a 
company’s total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher.112 For large 
companies handling a huge amount of data, such as Facebook and Google, 
these administrative fines under the GDPR could be enormous, and are likely 
to be the highest in the history of regulation. 
Competition and data protection have very different origins, but in the 
EU especially, they are currently very dynamic areas of the law. Since 2007, 
competition enforcement actions in the EU, based on legal principles dating 
back to the Treaty of Rome, have become much more commonplace. Data 
protection law, on the other hand, has developed and gone through multiple 
changes since its introduction in 1995. With the introduction of GDPR, both 
bodies of law wield a great amount of power over companies that have a 
presence in the EU, giving the EU the power to levy high enough fines that 
they could hypothetically force violators to remedy their behavior. 
IV. THE 2006 ASNEF-EQUIFAX CASE 
In 2006, the Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) 
sued the Spanish consumer credit reference agency Asnef-Equifax and the 
credit bureau registration Asnef-Equifax administered for violation of Article 
81 of the EC.113 Asnef-Equifax’s credit bureau registration was intended to 
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“provide solvency and credit information through the computerized 
processing of data”114 which included information related to “the identity and 
economic activity of debtors.”115 This sort of information sharing is 
commonplace in the credit reporting industry as it allows for a mutually 
beneficial business model for consumers, lenders, and the economy.116 
Case-law on information exchange agreements indicates that such 
agreements violate competition law only if they reduce or remove uncertainty 
in market operations so as to restrict competition.117 The court agreed with 
Asnef-Equifax and held that the horizontal information sharing was 
harmless, arguing that the arrangement would likely “improv[e] the 
functioning of the supply of credit”118 and increase the mobility of consumer 
credit.119 Whether the proposed consumer benefit has actually manifested 
since this decision is unclear, though the global financial crisis would seem 
to indicate that it has not.120 Most significantly for the topic of this note, the 
court held that “any possible issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data 
are not, as such, a matter for competition law”121 and “may be resolved on 
the basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection.”122 
There are a few plausible reasons for the court’s decision. First, 
integration of EU credit markets was at the time a top priority for the EU at 
the time and helped facilitate the four freedoms – free movement of goods, 
capital, services, and people123 - of the European market.124 Second, there 
was little substantive overlap and sometimes even conflict between the two 
bodies of law.125 Third, the court viewed data protection law in Europe as 
robust and thought that it should be left to function as intended. Though in 
2006 these reasons may have held weight, what has transpired since makes 
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the court’s reasoning less convincing. 
The global financial crisis of 2008, which hurt many consumers, 
occurred at least partially because lenders were granting loans to consumers 
who could not afford them, something information sharing by credit 
reporting agencies was meant to prevent.126 Hacking attacks have 
proliferated127 and companies making money by controlling and using 
personal and private data have amassed enormous market power.128 It is far 
from clear that the comprehensive yet reactive GDPR will be sufficient to 
protect consumer interests. 
Despite the flaws in the Asnef-Equifax v. Ausbanc ruling, the court has 
held in a similar fashion in subsequent cases. In 2010, the ECJ held in 
AstraZeneca v. Commission that to bring a competition case on the basis of 
an abuse of dominant market position, there must be “at the very least 
evidence that . . . [the] conduct is such as to restrict competition,”129 
effectively excluding causes of action based on privacy concerns.130 The 
European Commission cleared the Facebook/WhatsApp merger in 2014 
because data concentration was not seen to create competitive concerns.131 
However, the 2016 review of that case and new investigation by German 
competition authorities may indicate a new willingness from EU authorities 
to change their approach when it comes to data protection and competition.132 
A change, sooner rather than later, would be well advised as consumer 
information becomes more vulnerable and valuable to hackers. In 2011, a 
FBI chief cyber official warned of the increasing frequency and severity of 
cyber-attacks, and this is exactly what the world has witnessed since.133 In 
2017, credit agency Equifax suffered a data breach involving the sensitive 
personal information of 143 million people, and globally, nearly two billion 
total records have been lost or stolen in the first half of the year.134 
Hackers are also increasingly sophisticated in the type of data they 
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target, going after the most sensitive consumer information such as medical 
records and social security numbers.135 In response, the EU must take steps 
to better protect consumers and their fundamental right to privacy.136 A new 
method of authentication, biometrics - proposed for use by airports and 
financial institutions and implemented on the iPhone - poses an even greater 
risk for consumers, since biometric information is even less replaceable than 
a social security number.137 Such technological advances for the purposes of 
supposedly increased security and convenience make it even more important 
to implement strong policies to protect consumer data. 
V. ACTIONS THAT EU CAN TAKE 
In response to the increased security threat to consumer data, there are 
a few different routes the EU can pursue. First, the EU can continue to treat 
competition law and data protection law as independent bodies of law, 
consistent with the Asnef-Equifax decision. Second, the EU can develop a 
new body of law to cover the grey area where competition law and data 
protection overlap and conflict. Finally, the EU can choose to apply existing 
law differently, namely Article 101(3) of the TFEU, so that consumer welfare 
is considered during merger review and competition lawsuits like Asnef-
Equifax. 
A. Separate Treatment of Competition and Data Protection Law 
The first option is viable, if not ideal, because of the lengths the EU took 
to ramp up and strengthen its data protection law in the last five years. The 
EU announced its decision to draft a new regulation that would replace the 
1995 Directive in 2012,138 and the GDPR finally became binding and 
applicable on May 25, 2018.139 The independent development of data 
protection law makes it somewhat similar to sector regulation. There is a 
history of various industries, including telecommunications, water services, 
electricity, and aviation, adopting sectoral regulation because those particular 
industries were exempt from following the standard rules of competition.140 
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Sectoral regulation is typically broader in scope than competition law, 
going beyond economic considerations to impose technical and access 
requirements.141 Likewise, the GDPR covers more ground in the data privacy 
and protection space than EU competition law would or could. Traditional 
sectoral regulation and data protection regulation diverge when the law 
operates: sectoral regulation tends to be proactive, whereas data protection 
regulation is reactive.142 This means that it is unlikely the data regulation will 
come into play without some sort of data breach event, making it very likely 
that consumers will suffer some sort of harm. Despite being the easiest route 
for the EU, the threat of increasing consumer harm means the status quo—
—the do-nothing approach——is not optimal. 
B. Creation of a New Body of Law 
The EU also has the option of drafting an entirely new body of law to 
cover the current gap and the occasional conflict between competition law 
and data protection law. As already discussed, however, the drafting and 
procedural process for enacting new regulatory law is very slow.143 With the 
increasing threat of hack attacks, unnecessary delay will be harmful to 
consumers and not optimal. Further, many companies, especially technology 
companies that process large amounts of data, have expended time, energy, 
and resources to understanding and readying for compliance under GDPR.144 
These companies would not be happy about having to comply with an 
additional, complicated body of law.145 Therefore, this option is the least 
viable because it involves the largest amount of government work, would not 
offer adequate protection to consumers within the relevant timeframe, and 
would exacerbate companies’ frustrations with the already complicated EU 
regulation requirements. 
C. New Application of Existing Laws 
The third path available to the EU is changing how to apply existing 
competition law and integrating certain data protection concepts into the 
competitive review process. This route, while requiring some work from the 
EU, would increase the safeguards on individual data and could even help 
companies proactively strengthen their internal data protection systems and 
comply with GDPR, before a breach arises. The European Data Protection 
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Supervisor (EDPS) recommended as such, proposing that the Commission 
broaden the concept of consumer harm to include violation of individual data 
rights.146 The hook for this approach would be Article 101(3) of the TFEU, 
which allows for an exception to certain competition violations, like an 
agreement to share information, if such behavior “contributes to improving 
the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”147 
During a 2015 speech, Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager 
stated that “sometimes, intellectual property rights can be used to restrict 
competition” which can “also harm consumers.”148 She concluded that in 
situations where intellectual property law does not fully promote consumer 
welfare, competition law can be used as a balancing complement.149 One 
solution the EU can consider is the interaction between the FRAND patent 
standard and competition law.150 A similar scheme can be established 
between competition law and data protection law; in situations where 
consumer welfare is not fully covered by data protection law, competition 
law could be used as a balancing complement. Two situations where this 
integrated approach could prove useful are (i) data exchange between 
companies151 and (ii) the merging of companies holding large amounts of 
consumer data. This solution would be apt considering the similarities 
between the European rights-based data protection regime and intellectual 
property law. 
D. Possible Avenues of Implementation 
The first place where this complementary integration can occur is in the 
competition law process of merger review.152 While going through the 
merger review process, the European Commission can incorporate a review 
of the amount of data held by the consolidating entities as well as a review 
of their respective privacy policies. The Commission has expressed concern 
that consolidation and market power allows newly merged companies to take 
data protection less seriously, thereby increasing the risk of harm to 
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consumers.153 
Like the conditional grant of approval made by the Commission in 
Microsoft’s acquisition of LinkedIn, the Commission could make merger 
clearance conditional on companies having a robust, post-acquisition GDPR 
compliant data protection policy. Incorporating data protection principles 
into merger review would lead to stronger protection of consumer 
information while giving large companies the opportunity to be proactive in 
ensuring a post-close GDPR compliant data protection policy. This approach 
would be particularly favorable for companies if the company can use the 
post-close GDPR compliance as a defense, and therefore a way to avoid the 
severe penalties, should the company experience a data breach in the future. 
Competition law violation suits provide a vehicle to integrate data 
protection and competition law.154 In contrast to the decision made by the 
ECJ in 2006, through Article 101(3)of the TFEU155 the Court could find that 
horizontal data sharing is anti-competitive, by failing to provide the 
consumer with a fair share of the benefits, unless the data protection policy 
is strong enough to adequately protect the consumer data being shared. In the 
current age of information, where serious hack attacks are happening more 
frequently, a lack of robust and GDPR compliant data protection policies at 
all the businesses involved in sharing consumer information will likely lead 
to significant consumer harm and few benefits. Adding in data protection 
policy requirements would add a layer of protection for consumers and 
businesses, making horizontal information sharing more likely to create 
mutual benefits. 
As discussed above, consumers and businesses both stand to gain from 
integrating certain data protection concepts into the competition law 
processes of merger review and violation suits.156 Additionally the 
government would stand to gain under such a policy. First, consumers will 
benefit because their personal data and information will enjoy better 
protection. Businesses will benefit because having their data protection 
policies placed under review, especially during the merger review process 
but also during competition suits like Asnef-Equifax, could help them avoid 
steep GDPR administrative fines157 later. The government would also likely 
benefit because they would not have to create any new laws to fill the current 
gap between competition law and data protection. The caseload for data 
protection violations would also likely decrease because of the proactive 
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prevention of violations. If the goal of the government is to incentivize strong 
internal data protection policies for the benefit of consumers, this path is 
more sensible compared to the other options. 
This would not be the case, however, if the reason for GDPR and the 
recent antitrust suits was simply to make money by levying steep fines. It is 
interesting to note that nearly all of the companies that have been subject to 
merger review scrutiny, competition suits, and possible penalties have been 
U.S. companies, and none have been headquartered in the EU.158 Recently 
Qualcomm, a U.S. company that manufactures computer chips, was slapped 
with a € 997,439,000 fine (approximately $1.2 billion in U.S. dollars) for EU 
antitrust violations.159 That U.S. high-tech companies have faced the brunt of 
the EC’s antitrust scrutiny has been viewed as self-serving and 
protectionist.160 According to a new empirical study on European 
Commission merger control between 1990 and 2014, the data does not appear 
to support the hypothesis that enforcement in the EU is motivated by 
protectionism.161 
One possible drawback to the implementation of an integrated data 
protection and competition law approach is that it might increase scrutiny 
concerning data protection on new market entrants. These companies would 
be less likely than their larger competitors to have the resources and expertise 
necessary to implement robust internal data protection policies. These high 
expectations and regulatory hurdles could therefore lessen competition by 
discouraging new market entrants who would have otherwise entered in a 
less strict regulatory environment. Independently, GDPR will likely have a 
similar effect which means this concern should not be a reason not to use the 
integrated approach. In fact, looking forward, the implementation of the 
integrated approach would allow the EU to get ahead on protection of even 
more valuable consumer data before it hits the mass market. Such data will 
include biometric data (fingerprint, retina scan, etc.), electronic medical files, 
and DNA profile data, and will likely be widely collected and used by 
companies in the near future, to pass through airport security and perhaps 
even to make payments.162 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the best course of action for the EU is to implement an 
approach to competition law which incorporates certain data protection 
concepts. This integrated approach would serve as a complement to the 
already existing and robust bodies of competition and data protection law in 
the EU, and would provide another layer of protection for both consumers 
and companies. If implemented correctly it could lessen the risk of harm of 
data breach events to consumers, and lessen the risk of penalties faced by 
large companies controlling large amounts of vulnerable consumer data. 
The integrated approach is optimal because of its relatively low cost to 
implement, while offering significant gains to all interested parties: the 
consumers, the business community, and the government. The main point of 
contact between businesses and the government where this approach can be 
put to use is during the process of merger review. Additionally, the courts 
would have the option of reviewing and taking into consideration the data 
protection policies of companies subject to review as a result of anti-
competitive challenges, as was the case with Asnef-Equifax. 
European efforts to strengthen data protection law through the 
implementation of GDPR, and their increased enforcement of competition 
law against big technology companies indicate that Europe is ready for the 
added benefits of this integration. Things are very different in the U.S., 
however, and currently it seems unlikely that the integrated approach would 
be transferrable to the U.S.163 The first step for the United States will be 
developing a uniform data protection law, like the EU’s 1995 Directive or 
the 2018 GDPR. Until then, the integration of competition law and data 
protection law will remain a European creation. 
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